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On the 4th of October 2012, among the massive screens of Piccadilly Circus, one low, narrow, horizontal strip filled with animations by young filmmakers, animators and designers bringing life to the words of Cornish poet Charles Causley's lyric 'I am the song'. The occasion was National Poetry Day, the commission originating from the celebration's organisers Fast Forward Arts with IdeasTap, a design commissioning agency, and the results described by organiser William Siegert thus:
Every year this day is all about discovery, finding poetry in your environment, and it's refreshing that among the advertising messages of the Piccadilly Lights passers-by will find Charles Causley's reminder of the power of human expression, a commodity that money can't buy (Noah 2012).
The environment of Piccadilly Circus is continuously occupied by a form of popular poetry, advertising slogans. Causley's gently paradoxical lines ('I am the song that sings the bird'), each line challenging the normal appreciation of causality – the tide moves the moon, the clay shapes the hand – end with the admonition 'I am the word that speaks the man'. The project was a brave attempt to reinsert a non-commercial sense of the powers of language into a temple of its subservience to trade, admirable in its choice of verse and its encouragement of young artists to occupy so public a place with so subtle an intervention. Still the critic must wonder just how much this intervention can unpick the power implicit, in this context, of language, the language of advertising, to 'speak the man'. Can an aesthetic gesture undo the endless work of marketing?

Walter Benjamin countered the aestheticisation of politics with the politicisation of aesthetics. He could not have known that the grand strategy of neoliberalism would be the anaesthetisation of politics. The increasingly presidential mode of politics noted by Saskia Sassen (2006: 168-79) is no longer interested in the sublime terror of Hitler and Stalin, but in curiously passionless shadow-boxing between decreasingly distinguishable candidates. Political anaesthetics is matched by the anaesthesis of the economic under conditions of neo-liberalism, as acted out on public screens in public places. The res publica is no longer the public thing – Das Ding – of a common desire; no longer the matter (as old poets spoke of the Arthurian cycle as 'the matter of Britain') of the common good, the matter of how we are to live. In the occupation of public space by publicity, it is become the lesser question of how I am to live, further diminished to the choice between lifestyles, each of which imitates its neighbour such that each style is restricted to the same slender grasp of life. The life to which the public thing has shrunk is merely to continue. Its continuance is marked  by the accrual less of goods than of experiences, since goods would last too long for the manic reproductivity of free-falling capital. Experiences require eternal replacement, one after another. In this sense each experience has to be brief, exhilarating, ephemeral and unique in the sense only that it requires novelty. The good represented by a purchasable experience is a commodity in a service economy where a drink is no longer a drink but an affect available for individualised consumption. On the screens at Piccadilly Circus, on any other day, the affects on offer are far narrower than those plumbed in Causley's poem and its interpretations, far narrower than the range and subtlety of ordinary emotion.  

This narrowing of the field of experience has a corollary in the technical specifications of the screens themselves. Cameras are sold on their resolution, measured in megapixels; LED screens are promote don the strength of theirs, measured in thousands of lines. A domestic HD TV in 2012 typically had 1080 lines: the Piccadilly screens, like cinemas, boast 4K (four thousand line) resolution. What they do not include in the promotional material is the colour gamut. LED screens are composed of panels, each with an array of light-emitting diodes in one of three colours, red, green and blue, arranged in square units of four: one red, one blue and two green, green corresponding most closely to the brightness response in the normal human eye. The instructions sent to the screen for each frame specify the numerical value of the current sent to each diode, and so the relative balance of the three electronic primaries, and thus the colour. Even in optimum conditions, the range of colour available to digital displays is restricted. Except for laboratory models, screens can only reproduce about 40% of the range of colour seen by the human eye. In the open air, competing with other light sources, the gamut (the range) is even smaller, sacrificed to the need to be visible even in sunlight. The narrow band of colour matches the narrowing of affect. What matters is the consistency of, for example, the shade of red patented by Coca-Cola. 

The colour gamut of the screens is tuned to match an international standard observer, a construct of engineering and psychology establishing the norms for visual response to colour. While the colour blind (up to 20% of the male population) have by now learned to cope with their exclusion, the more insidious effect is to normalise the standard of perception. The average eye ought to perceive 4K resolution as immaculately photographic. The tricks of colour condensation and contrast used to make the colours seem more realistic not only aggregate around the palette that other psychologists have determined are associated with key affects like 'refreshing' or 'young', but both rely on and normalise normative ocular reactions to change across the field of the screen. The normativity of large screen technology expands on and concentrates display technologies in general, which today approach universality. Among their characteristics one is especially important for this study. While screens are made up of thousands of individual pixels and sub-pixel diodes, they are all composed in rigid grids of rows and columns, a totalitarian ordering of vision that accords with the dominance of spreadsheets, databases and geographic information systems in 21st century rule. Each four-diode pixel can theoretically produce any one of millions of colours, but each can only be composed of three elementary hues, and can only appear as a square unit in a composed array. In what follows, we can take this as a diagram of the structure of the crowds passing through or lingering in Piccadilly Circus, their faces, their eyes, illuminated by this regiment of controlled surface texture and colour.

The public that threatened in the early 20th century to become mass became instead the lonely crowd, and the lonely crowd in turn has become a circuit of managed desires no longer adding up to individuals. When Laclau (2005) describes the unit of populist politics as demands, he approaches an understanding of this new condition, where the units are neither social nor individual but desires in movement, unanchored from biography and mobilised in currents through the tides of quotidian human affairs. The process by which communities and extended families were reduced to the nuclear family of the classic consumer society of Keynesianism continued in the Bretton Woods era to produce as unit of consumption the atomised individual. Neo-liberalism, coinciding with personal computing, internet and mobile media, encouraged the break-up of the individual, just as the previous regime encouraged the break-up of the nuclear family in an epidemic of divorce. Now only unanchored desires function as sub-individual social particles. We have moved from the molecular family to the atomic individual and thence to the quantum dynamic of desire, at which point the art of managing desires takes over from politics as the conduct of public life. This is the level of socialisation addressed in public screens in city centres. 

At their best, social media attempt to reconstruct the individual just as, at its best (the BBC's Dr Who for example) contemporary TV attempts to reconstruct the nuclear family. Spectacular media attempt to reconstruct community, most successfully at events like the Glastonbury Festival or the Big Day Out. The challenge for public screen art is particularly hard because it attempts to secure the ideal of community not just in a temporary autonomous zone like festivals, but in precisely those spaces which are most inimical to community: city centres. For large screens and their potential interactions with various modes of public and various publics, the question raised by Mark Shepard is especially relevant: 'To what degree will people using these technologies be empowered to share, participate, and create?' (Greenfield and Shepard 2007: 23).

The city centre is confluence of passengers: tourists, commuters, and migrants who have yet to learn that the city centre is a fiction. Taksim and Tahrir still belong to production economies, which is why action there is more than symbolic. These are theatres of action in the mythic sense of theatre – places where acts matter, where history can be made in the manner of the matter of Britain. In the service and finance economies of the metropoles, Trafalgar or Times Square are spaces where symbols are manipulated in accord with the shape of semiocapital, but actual political action cannot or at least does not happen. In its place are the great LED screens. The remnant of theatre is merely a name, the 'circus' in Piccadilly Circus marked only as the circulation of vehicles, not the tumult and communal self-celebration of the republican circuses of pre-imperial Rome. Here are manipulated the symbols of commonality, of coming together, that once made the steps under the statue of Eros a hippy rendezvous. Since 2002, the old neon lights (and before them the flashing bulbs) have given way to big screens at Piccadilly, and only bewildered young travellers gather to find that missing sense of authenticity that every traveller craves. 

Coca Cola have held onto their real estate on the corner between Glasshouse Street and Shaftesbury Avenue since 1955. The flashing logo has given way to a curving high-definition LED screen carrying animated graphics and film footage that bends around the architecture long since buried under the hoardings. The Coca Cola corporation is ranked as the world's number one brand by Interbrand (2012), who gauge the brand value at close to USD8 billion. The London Olympics accepted major sponsorship from Coke in 2012, reasserting what Interbrand refer to as its 'brand promise of fun, freedom, and refreshment' to a global TV viewership in the billions. With a logo dating to 1885 and the distinctive contour bottle to 1920, Coca Cola has a long association with the most advanced forms of marketing, including sponsorship of the Olympics since 1928. The medical claims made for the original formula, which contained significant amounts of cocaine, faded away in the 1920s, to be replaced with a series of catchy slogans, while international franchising of bottling and canning not only opened new markets but gave the company the materials for its claims not only to be 'the real thing' but to be the world's favourite drink (Hays 2005). The 1916 commission for bottle design called for it to be recognisable even when broken: the patented red of the cans have a similar function. The litter from the soft drink continues to carry the brand message. Its position in Piccadilly Circus is then not surprising. A neighbouring screen promotes McDonald's, number 7 on the Interbrand chart at USD40 billion, another packaging and logo-heavy brand. 

These two, Coca Cola and McDonald's, have clear aspirations to speak to the consumer directly at a major tourist destination; and to promote a youthful, even pre-teen profile. Their prominence in this public space is then a marker not only of the triumph of branding over substance (the combination of McDonald's and Coke as substitute for a meal), but as a symbol for the infantilisation of the public conducted in its name. The boundless repetition of the video loops on these two screens has the obsessive pattern of Freud's shell-shocked veterans of the First World War, condemned to re-enact their traumas (Freud 1984: 281ff), but in this instance, it is not trauma but an invented childhood that is repeated, a fort-da game whose nonchalant whimsy all too easily discloses an underlying anxiety. This enactment of neurotic compulsion in public belongs to the same formation as the infantilisation that clothes it, and to the mobilisation of both fear and apotropaic comforts in what passes for political life. The conduct of consensus politics (Mouffe 2005) depends on a double infantilisation. The focus group is asked simplified questions, and its simplified answers form the agenda for politicians who are thus spared the problem of thinking about the conduct of public life as anything but a game of king-of-the-castle. A child's diet, and one associated otherwise with adults playing with (or at being) children, dominates this crowded public arena. The faces it illuminates are themselves not only infantilised but, like a child, disburdened of their inhibitions, their desires encouraged to expression without shame: the freedom promised by the fizz. 

Pictured on the screen is a scene of companionship, not romance: a small utopia of friendship governed only by the play ethic. Philosophy has toyed with play as a central part of human (and mammalian) being from Bakhtin (1968) to Gadamer (1986), but always in the context of discussions presuming the overarching importance of social bonds to keep play within bounds. Where cultural studies has embraced play as social good (for example in Fiske 1987), it runs the risk of falling into the shameless freedom of a market culture, and one where desire is not simply freed from social repression, but divorced from the desiring subject. Shame is painful, and like all pain it serves to warn that something bad is happening. Removing shame is like removing pain: an invitation to damage yourself, and worse still, to damage others. Shame is founded in the mutual debt we owe one another, the founding solidarity of human existence. The freedom of Coca Cola, the more shameless for being conducted so publicly, is freedom from shame. It is couched in the infantile because there we all find a memory of life before shame. At the same time, a shameless existence is one where sociality exists only to gratify the self, to prove to 'his majesty the baby' that he is indeed the centre of the affective universe. This innocent playfulness is thus regressive, both reflecting and reduplicating the unanchored desires flowing through the Circus for the experiences that stand in the place of public good. 

The third major advertiser is Samsung, the South Korean electronics firm, (number 9 in Interbrand's listing, USD30 billion), also a major sponsor of the London Olympics (the fourth advertiser, also South Korean, is Hyundai cars, sponsors of the UEFA soccer league, anxious to build their brand in Europe). Samsung is one of numerous major firms monetising media convergence by integrating computers, mobiles, televisions and domestic white goods into seamless digital ecologies, the internet of things. A Samsung mobile taking a video of the lights to play back on a Samsung TV is a perfect walled garden moment: a closed loop of integrated media in which nothing escapes the corporate synergy. This is the obverse of the myth of freedom: the myth of security, comfort and ease, the myth of control. The spectacular scale of the boards, and the equally spectacular cost (Hyundai, the most recent contract, is reported variously to cost between one and five million pounds per year) suggest that control by the viewers is elsewhere, as are all promised publicity delights. The electronic advertising of electronic goods synchronises with high-density screens as an image of constant change, constant renewal, even as it promises the secure pleasure of mastery which the replacement cycle, of images and product lines, denies. Control lies elsewhere: not only beyond the point of purchase, but beyond the capability of the unformed audience of the screens: an estimated two million pedestrians a year. This floating population is a mass without power, invited to share the fantasy of power that belongs properly to the corporations who advertise here. Thus the screens at Piccadilly reenact the fort of freedom from parental, governmental, social and even conscience-bound control, and the da of the fantasy of complete control, like the child throwing away and retrieving its toy in Freud's scenario (1984: 283-5). This alternating play of control and its loss is the tumbling of waves of unanchored desire in an endlessly titillating, endlessly distracting rub of sensation that replaces, taking the public place of, a public that is never formed, but whose energy is hydrologically harnessed to the requirements of consumerism, the necessary remedy for the perpetual crisis of over-production.  

Once the centre of sociological speculation, the crowd no longer draws the attention that it once did. Works like Freud's 1921 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Freud 1987) and Ortega y Gasset's 1930 Revolt of the Masses (Ortega y Gasset 1985) had a profound influence on the thinking of their times. For Simmel (1950: 409) 'The deepest problems of modern life flow from the attempt of the individual to maintain the independence and individuality of his existence against the sovereign powers of society, against the weight of historical heritage and the external culture and technique of life'. The obverse was also the case for the tradition from Matthew Arnold to TS Eliot that sought to preserve society, heritage and culture from the anarchy of the masses. At this stage, sociology was the study of the relationship between individuals and societies, neither term thrown into doubt. As doubts did begin to emerge about the credibility of either term as a given, and processes of sociation and individuation took precedence, the concept of the crowd waned. Yet Simmel's warning should detain us, because it is clear that the individual has indeed crumbled under the pressures brought to bear on it and the responsibilities it was asked to take over from larger and more robust formations like the extended family. With the waning of the European dictatorships of the 1930s, the crowd lost its place in Western political life. 

Its recurrence has always brought with it a frisson of the old terror, however. Urban uprisings in France, the UK and Greece elicit tsunamis of press, accompanied by claims such as that of UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, interviewed on radio news the morning after the urban riots of August 2011, that only when the priorities of more police, trials and sentencing were resolved 'in the weeks and months to come' could we 'have the sociological debate'. Crises of this sort are, however, precisely the moment at which the lack of sociology has become critical, contributing to the elite ignorance of politicians and media commentators. The crowd is a foreign phenomenon to the West, both figuratively and literally: it belongs elsewhere, to the streets of Teheran or Damascus. The policed and self-disciplining crowds of sport, especially UK Premier League soccer and any major US sport are a last gasp of modernity, now tied to the corporate goals of team owners and players treated as advertising hoardings. That the most popular use of urban screens has been to retransmit sporting events is no accident: the artificial combat of the Olympics or the Ashes occupies the agora, the agon of games in place of the agon of politics, celebrations of hostility in place of discovering who this 'we' is that supports a national or a local team, both in any case ripped untimely from their geography to stand as brands in a consumable universe. 

The city centre is no longer then a theatre of politics but of commerce, and commerce itself is no longer trade between equals but the offerings of vast corporations to a populace whose actions are reduced to bogus choices between ephemeral and dreary services. The condition of the crowd has changed, from the self-organising throng marching to demand a voice in political life to atomised and managed foot-traffic. Like iatrogenic diseases invented to fit the prophylactic profile of new pharmaceuticals, biopolitically generated desires are tailored to fit the products on offer, and bear the same relation to political or aesthetic need as newly nominated 'diseases' do to health and well-being. But there is no return to a lost authenticity of individuality, itself as completely constructed as its pair, society. We cannot reconvene historic forms of community, any more than we can restore belief in the Olympian gods. If it is true that urban screens are symptomatic of this new condition of the crowd, then analysis must seek in the screens the contradictions formed in the new modes of crowd-formation, the contradiction between ideologies of freedom and control framed in an infantilising discourse. Public screens cannot but be political, in the sense that they address a public in public space. Today the anaesthesia of the economic messages of commercial screens is matched by the apolitical tenor of managed viewership carried in a discourse marked by childishness. The opportunities for a political aesthetic of public screens will then lie in the nexus of growing up, and moving either beyond the dialectic of freedom and control, or dive-bombing the two conflicting concepts. 

Though there have been some few cultural uses of the Piccadilly screens, for example to show poetry associated with British Waterways in 2013, one of the rare interventions to use them politically was performed by Fluxus artist Yoko Ono who hired one screen for three months to display a banner, with black letters on a white background, reading 'Imagine all the people living life in peace', words written by her murdered husband, the musician John Lennon. Ono, whose work includes film, video, music, performance, event-scores and poetry, had the words printed in sans serif script, centred, in two lines split at the caesura after 'people'. The fabric, robust enough to take three months of weather, wrapped over one of the curved screens, was held in place by guy ropes threaded through eyelets, with enough give to allow the wind to move it slightly, and sufficient transparency for the word NESCAFE, brand of the normal contractor for this screen at the time,  to appear through the fabric in daylight. 

Though the message printed on it was unambiguous, the choice of wrapping the screen (at this time comprising a matrix of neon) emphasised not the architectural or geological form underneath in the manner of a Christo wrapping project, but the not totally achieved wrapping of the commercial message underneath the tarpaulin. So it is not only the message of Lennon's lyric that fights against the commercial publicity, but the replacement of a commercial message which itself concealed the architecture beneath it, and its containment under a simpler technological as well as verbal form. Where the word 'Nescafé' denotes directly the brand and like most invented brand names avoids any other connotations, the tarp wrapping it connotes the absence of the original brand, while denoting an actuality: the act of imagination which the imperative form of the verb 'Imagine' evokes. Imagining buying instant coffee is not of the same quality, and few advertisers revert to imperatives as good sales. The poet Ono has turned the lyric into an event-score, on a par with her Fluxus event-scores of the 1960s like those collected in her 1964 book Grapefruit:
Imagine the clouds dripping.
Dig a hole in your garden to
Put them in.
Lennon's lyric takes on new life as an alternative mode of imagination-as-action, against the technically unimaginable brand essence of the coffee-maker. The utopian force of Lennon's words functions against the shrouded backdrop of a dystopia: the unrecognisable traduction of coffee beans into fast food. The occlusion is the opposite of cynicism, which Peter Sloterdijk (1988: 5) described thus:
this is the essential point about cynicism, the ability of its bearers to work, in spite of anything that might happen, and especially after anything that might happen. . . .  A certain chic bitterness provides an undertone to its activity. For cynics are not dumb, and every now and then they certainly see the nothingness to which everything leads. Their psychic apparatus has become elastic enough to incorporate as a survival factor a permanent doubt about their own activities . . . the new, integrated cynicism even has the understandable feeling about itself being a victim and of making sacrifices.
Ono's banner is not complicit in this, either in the 'enlightened false consciousness' Sloterdijk analysed in the government and media professions, or in the mass cynicism which is its heir in the 21st century, brought about by globalisation and the systematic precarisation of labour, resulting in the dissolution of social solidarity, and thence the widespread sense of despair evidenced by the English riots of 2011. It is not simply to refuse despair, or to seize with Bloch (1986) the principle of hope: that utopia can not and must not be planned. The task of art, above all of a political aesthetic, is to prise open a space where the possibility of a future can be permitted to grow. The sense of potentiality lodged in the banner – the way almost every passer-by can hear in their imaginations Lennon singing the lines, an exercise in simple imagining that opens up the possibility of imagining peace – concerns releasing precisely those powers of unanchored desire which are the hallmark of the 21st century crowd.

Occluding the screen is a symbolic gesture fitting the symbol-manipulation of semiocapital, but at the same time an act of interruption in the incessant repetitions of neoliberal public life. The challenge picked up by Ono is the devolution of political responsibility from the rich and powerful to the poor and oppressed. The cycle of economic crises in since the 1970s has been funded through futures and derivatives, the trade in debt. These debts are traded in the form of pledges of future earnings which are to be spent in the present. The cycle initiated by over-production can no longer be covered reducing wages (there are too few workers left in automated factories), and capital cannot continue to expand, as it must to survive, if it pays its own debts. Debt therefore becomes the individual responsibility of the poor, even though it is a manifest absurdity to blame the poor for their poverty, or to say that it is they who owe money to the rich. Likewise the abject failure of the political elite to make crucial decisions about, for example, climate change, is turned into an individual ethical demand that each of us consume differently in order to change the planet. This devolution of responsibility goes along with a centralisation of wealth and power. Ironically however, the incompetence of economic and political managers to plan for crises expresses a truth about contemporary political economies: that they are no longer commanded by people. Rather the new corporate cyborgs operate without human agency, yet as the most powerful social and historical agents of our time. 

Berardi notes that 
peaceful demonstrations have not been able to change the agenda of the European Central Bank, as the national parliaments of the European countries are hostages of the Maastricht rules, which are financial automatisms working as the material constitution of the Union. Peaceful demonstrations are effective in the frame of democracy, but democracy is over now that techno-financial automatisms have taken over the place of political decisions (Berardi 2012: 53)
It is at this level of the automaton that Ono's banner works, hiding and revealing, in the manner of a fetish, the inhuman compulsive enunciation of capital's closed future. At the same time, it is widely reported that Ono paid GBP150 thousand for the use of the screen. To this extent she is complicit in the continuing functioning of the screens as landmark of capitalist Öffentlichkeit. Yet the gesture of purchase gives her as actuality the one thing that is forever pledged but never delivered to the passing viewers in the Circus: control. In this way, the banner reveals the stupidity of the screens' owners, the triumph of avarice over even self-preservation which is the hallmark of contemporary energy markets and governments hell-bent on repeating the same lending strategies which created the current global financial crisis in the first place. 

Berardi's argument leads him towards a specific diagnosis of the malaise here described as the divorce of desires from selves, which appears to him as a crisis of ethics expressed in the weak forms of social organisation emerging in the Indignado and Occupy movements: 'The ethical disorder, the inability to ethically manage individual and collective life, seems to follow from a disturbance of the aesthesia, the perception of the other and of the self' (Berardi 2012: 127). Ono's event-scores have always played between a pop surrealism and a zen-like koan: in this instance, the event-score evokes a moment of popular culture, returning, as Bloch did, and as many commentators on utopia from Raymond Williams to Fredric Jameson, Tom Moylan and Ruth Levitas have done, to the utopian wellsprings of folklore and, for the 20th and 21st centuries, to the powers of popular song to mobilise a raft of yearnings, from the sexual to the spiritual, and very commonly communal and political. The aesthetic to which this banner appeals and with which it works operates in the gap between the open-ended imagination of pop and the closed repetition of advertising. Where the pop song typically fades out, lacking an ending, the advert proposes a terminal for the desire it mobilises: the terminus of purchase. The claim the banner makes on us – to imagine – is not terminable. 

Nor is it countable or accountable, and therefore it is unaccounted for. The imagination of advertising is always premised on the commodity relation: that of the Imagine banner is not: because it cannot be counted, it cannot be exchanged. In this sense it liberates Baudrillard's (1972) concept of sign-value: this sign is not an exchangeable quantum but uses the evolution of symbolic capital as its lever for producing a utopian negation. There is a risk here. Using the techniques of mass address risks replicating dislocated desiring. But there is no other way to occupy metropolitan public space except as a dissolved subject, one whose connectivity places it both here and elsewhere, and whose sensual regimes are endlessly tickled by the flux of desire and control. To imagine, and to imagine not only oneself but the lives of others, otherwise, is to work at the level of these dissociated desires and to work at that level to re-integrate them into a new mode of community. The risk remains, as it does for those political philosophers in the wake of Deleuze and Guattari who argue for the importance of singularity. The singularity all too easily falls into the flux of exchange and the quantum mechanics of biopower, where it is considered as (a return to) individuation. 

The individual is not the unit of economics or power: indeed, wherever we meet the concept of the unit, we meet the destructive universality of the countable that characterises the operation of the commodity relation. At the same time, pure flux, in the forms of Bergsonian politics espoused by Deleuze and Guattari, has become the preferred mode of rule under conditions of biopolitical population management. The singularity to which Ono's Imagine command brings us is rather the construction of unique moments of solidarity between the flows of desire when they become demands. Badiou places these moments in the genuinely political moments when drifts of heterogenous desires form alliances, and sees in such moments the greatest threat to the status quo. Drawing on the recent history of urban uprisings in the banlieux and cités of Paris he writes
The State has no other major task except to prohibit, by all possible means, including violent ones, any connection, even limited, between the popular youth of the 'cities' and the students, between the students and the mass of ordinary salaried workers, among the latter and the newly arrived proletarians, and even, despite its apparent naturalness, any connection between the popular youth and the proletarian newcomers, between sons and fathers (Badiou 2012: 22).
Commenting on an earlier expression of the same theme in Badiou, Agamben notes
For the State, therefore, what is important is never the singularity as such, but only its inclusion in some identity, whatever identity (but the possibility of the whatever itself being taken up without an identity is a threat the State cannot come to terms with (Agamben 1993: 86)
Individuality incurs identification, the process of ascribing identity. If Badiou falls into the trap laid by strategic discourse of allocating identities to the actors in urban politics, Agamben gently corrects him by insisting that it is the lack of identity – in the present analysis the product of the dissolution of the binds of desire from individuality – that emerges as the 'whatever' that escapes rule and the commodity relation. This is the task undertaken by the Piccadilly banner. 

Equally significant for the current enquiry is that this was only one of three iterations of the same project, reprised in Times Square, New York and at the Ginza in Tokyo. The three cities have biographical connections for the artist, but equally draw attention to her position as cosmopolitan, a role predating her marriage. This cosmopolitanism is explicitly formed along the distinction Papastergiadis draws between Kantian, rational cosmopolitanism and aesthetic cosmopolitanism: not grounded in duty and the categorical imperative but in love, the theme of so much of Ono's public work and her collaborations with Lennon. Ono's aesthetic cosmopolitanism is effected through imagination. Papastergiadis (2012: 90) defines it thus: 'Imagination – irrespective of the dimensions of the resulting form – is a world picture-making process. Imagination is therefore a crucial starting point for cosmopolitanism'. In many respects, imagining is the most difficult task in public spaces where the foundation of imagination, desire, is already carefully channelled according to the automatic operations of commodity supply, and chained to its opposite, the infantile fantasy of control. In an era when the work of the working class has become more and more the work of disciplined consumption, the chaining of desire to control is the most important outcome of what Badiou calls the State, not to be confused with the geographically-bounded apparatus of national rule. The State in question is more a state of affairs: the global organisation of flows of energy, materials, money, power and desires. Taking the principle of divide and rule to its logical extreme, the global State, as cyborg, dissolves all social bonds. Rather than embrace an all-too-often fascist nostalgia for imagined past communities, the task undertaken in Ono's Imagine is to find alternative ways that desires, and indeed fantasies of control, can be given the opportunity to become.
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